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the  Certified  General  Accountants  Association  of  Canada  (CGA-Canada)
issued a comprehensive paper on defined benefit pension plans in June of
2004 titled “Addressing the Pensions Dilemma in Canada”. The goal of that
release was to advance understanding of defined benefit (DB) pension plans
along with inherent risks and imperfections, to impart a reasonable estimate of
the standing of DB pension plans at December 31, 2003 and to explore potential
remedies for consideration by stakeholders. 
In large part motivated by a steady stream of media coverage focussing on
pension plan shortfalls and a concern for the long-term viability of DB plans,
CGA-Canada advocated for reforms and also saw fit to update December 31,
2003 estimates with a December 31, 2004 assessment. Building on its June
2004 publication, a second publication titled “The State of Defined Benefit
Pension Plans in Canada: An Update” was issued in 2005 with the goal of 
further advancing public understanding. Serving as precursor studies to this
current work, additional background and context can be gained by referring to
these publications, and others, on the www.cga.org/canada website. 
Consistent with earlier findings, the issue of under-funded pension plans has
become one of the most perplexing financial issues facing business executives,
legislators and Canadian pensioners who are or will in the future be reliant on
pension income as an important component of their overall retirement incomes.
Importantly, we would continue to support an approach that corrects fundamental
or structural imperfections and systemic influences.
While there are a variety of public examples of what happens when pension
regimes become dysfunctional for workers, recent Canadian experiences with 
the likes of Nortel Networks, AbitibiBowater, Fraser Papers, and CanWest
underscore  that  pension  plan  default  can  occur  within  companies  of  any 
magnitude. More so, these events highlight a need to better preserve pension
plan solvency and member protection. 
Foreword
78
CGA-Canada remains committed to making a meaningful contribution to the
ongoing debate on pension issues facing Canadians. We also trust that the content
of this report effectively expands on our earlier works while complementing
the collective efforts of other professional organizations, regulators, plan sponsors,
members and their representatives. 
Anthony Ariganello, CPA (Delaware), FCGA
President and Chief Executive Officer
The Certified General Accountants Association of Canada9 9
Since we last revisited the subject of pensions in 2005, a new economic world
order has eclipsed the earlier one, with the imbalance in Canadian demography
becoming more pronounced as the first wave of baby boomers prepare to retire
as early as 2011. In an atmosphere of heightened public debate, governments
appear poised or otherwise challenged to bring meaningful improvements to
Canada’s retirement system. 
Building on earlier works, in anticipation of much needed change, CGA-Canada
once again commissioned in 2009 MERCER Human Resources Consulting to
advance analysis on the funding status of private defined benefit (DB) pension
plans at December 31, 2008. Relying on information contained in the 2008
MERCER Pension Database, an estimate of the funding positions of Canadian
pension plans as at December 31, 2008 is herein submitted under the risk 
free basis approach. This analysis is based on 761 plans, covering a total of
1,496,000 members on December 31, 2008 compared to 784 plans and 1,787,000
members for the calculations as at December 31, 2004.
Serving as a representative sample from which to draw conclusions, these
plans constitute approximately 30% of all such plans in Canada. As such, the
approach adopted has been to evaluate the combined performance of many of
the plans with which MERCER Human Resource Consulting has a professional
relationship and required composite knowledge. Consistent also with our 
earlier works, CGA-Canada has recognized the importance and appropriateness
of retaining the expertise of MERCER Human Resources Consulting in 
the research and presentation of these findings. In addition to the provided
MERCER  findings  and  publicly  available  Statistics  Canada  information
accessed, publicly available information from academic and non-academic
sources has been drawn upon and referenced. 
What is most apparent is that the magnitude of the pension plan challenge 
has amplified. Funding deficits have intensified with funding ratios eroding to
unsustainable levels. Moreover, we have witnessed a disturbing trajectory
where an estimated $160 billion required to fully fund deficit DB pension
plans at 2003 year end grew to $190 billion by the end of 2004 and has 
expectedly revealed itself to be much worse at the end of 2008.  
In the interest of clarity, reference to pension plans in this paper shall relate
specifically to defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension 
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plansregistered with a provincial or federal pension authority unless otherwise
expressed. This paper does not address or represent the state of supplementary
employee retirement plans (SERP), defined benefit pension plans for Federal
public employees (PSSA) or Québec public employees (RREGOP). Focusing
primarily on single employer pension plans, multi-employer pension  plans
which tend to attract different funding and accounting issues, have also been
excluded from findings and conclusions expressed herein.  
Throughout the following pages, the aggregate performance of private DB plans
is discussed, as too are the prospects of defined contribution (DC) and hybrid
plans. Findings related to Canadian population demographics are presented so
as to contextualize the gravity of the retirement income landscape. Along the
journey, a rudimentary attempt has been made also to contrast the benefits of
DB pension plans with those of defined contribution retirement investments.
Rounding out the discussion, an abstract of recent accounting changes is 
presented, as well as some of the principles required of any contemplated 
pan-Canadian solutions.
Finally,  this  paper  focuses  on  the  renaissance  of  the  Canadian  retirement 
system. A holistic approach that encompasses regulatory, structural and strategic
changes that are de rigueur for the coalescence and enhancement of the 
current system are called for. 
The post retirement expectations and needs of the “boomer” generation, a group
that will live longer than previous generations, will place enormous demands
on the country’s health and social support systems. The ability of Canadians
to maintain a financially comfortable and healthy lifestyle after retirement has
become one of this country’s most vexing challenges. For many Canadians,
post-retirement health and well-being are increasingly and inextricably tied to
Canada’s pension system. Unfortunately, and the evidence is compelling, the
pension system in this country has deteriorated significantly. There are problems
related to under-funding, to allegations of archaic accounting practices and to
sentiment of redundant legislation and public policy.  
An abundance of literature that confirms the predicted risks of Canada’s fledgling
pension system and the proposed actions for transformation can be consulted.
At minimum, however, we need to accept that in order to address the challenges
before us we must realize that the pension system is gravely imperfect
and that there are options at our disposal. Only then can focus be directed
on creating a sustainable pension ‘system’that is financially viable, equitable,
and appropriately aligned with the retirement needs of all Canadians.11
A new world economic order has replaced the old one and the age of a “new
normal” has arrived, characterized by more globally inclusive economic 
policy, deleveraging of households, businesses and governments, and a shift
from consumption to saving. In the immediate future, growth is expected to be
slower,  average  return  on  assets  is  expected  to  be  sluggish,  and  inflation
expected to nip at our heels. Such a scenario, taken with recent economic
developments, signals a noteworthy paradigm shift for Canadians. Pension
constructs are not immune to these events and the challenges facing them can
only be aggravated by the structural imbalances of the Canadian demography.
Based on examination of available reference and commissioned study in relation
to Canadian defined benefit pension plans:
•  There are an estimated 7,000 private DB plans and an estimated 8,000 DC
plans having an estimated 4.5 million and 0.8 million members respectively.
DB assets exceed $550 billion while DC assets represent an estimated 
$50 billion.       
•  The overall funding position of DB plans has significantly deteriorated
since December 31, 2004 with the vast majority (92%) of private pension
plans in a deficit position as at December 31, 2008. The average funding
ratio has decreased from 112% to 77% on a ‘without indexation’ basis and
from 71% to 57% on a ‘with indexation’ basis. The aggregate funding
shortfall is expected to exceed $350 billion.
•  During the six month period from September 2008 to February 2009, the
typical  DB  pension  plan  lost  approximately  20%  of  its  assets  value, 
measured on a market value basis. According to estimates performed by
MERCER,  71%  of  Canadian  defined  benefit  pension  plans  were  in  a 
solvency deficit position at the end of 2007. By the end of 2008, that statistic
had risen to 92%. At the end of 2008, almost 40% of defined benefit plans
had solvency ratios under 70%, and over 70% of defined benefit plans had
solvency ratios under 80%.
In the case of Canadian defined contribution plans, a study
1 by Statistics Canada
staff indicates that:
•  Between 1991 and 2006, defined contribution (DC) plan membership almost
doubled, increasing by 93%. During the same period, defined benefit (DB)
plan membership declined by 4%.
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1  Philippe Gougeon. “Shifting pensions. Perspectives on Labour and Income.” Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
Summer 2009. Vol. 21, Iss. 2; pg. 43, 8 pgs12
• Membership fluctuations were greatest in the private sector, with DB plans
giving up 279,000 members between 1991 and 2006 and DC plans acquiring
382,000 additional members. Membership changes were insignificant in the
public sector.
•  Approximately  150,000  members  forfeited  by  DB  plans  resulted  from 
plan  conversions,  the  vast  majority  of  which  benefited  from  hybrid  or
mixed plans. DC plan growth came mostly from an increase in active plan
membership.
•  Neither industrial structure changes nor other factors used in a logistic
regression could explain the considerable increase in DC plans. 
A rudimentary break-even analysis presented herein under a set of straightforward
assumptions has been navigated for the purpose of determining the contribution
level at which an employee, ignoring non-financial factors, will be indifferent
to the type of pension plan (i.e. the benefits will be identical under both 
types of plans or through complimentary RRSP contributions). This analysis,
while revealing the superiority of DB plans, intimates that they are routinely
underpriced and that their true cost is not fully appreciated. 
All the while, it is encouraging to note that recent developments in Canadian
accounting standards which facilitate the planned transition to International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) effective in 2011 are expected to enhance
transparency and robustness of pension accounting.
In the more immediate future, CGA-Canada encourages the federal government
to affect the previously announced measure of increasing the pension liability
threshold for employer contributions from 10% to 25%. We also continue to
see well enhanced protection for plan members — recognizing more fully the
character  of  pension  benefits  as  deferred  compensation  requiring  greater
recognition as secured debt of the company and enhanced consideration in the
creditor hierarchy. Consistent with our submissions to the Department of Finance
and the Standing Committee on Finance, it is contended that deliberate 
clarification is required regarding the ownership and distribution of surpluses
on plan termination, the use of letters of credit, the time span for the funding
of deficits, and prescribed solvency ratio levels.
As a pan-Canadian approach emerges to address the shortcomings of Canada’s
current pension system, its engineers will be well served to:
•  Design a pension system that is sustainable in the long term, fair to present
and future generations, simple to administer, and cost effective;
•  Recognize pension benefits as deferred compensation;
•  Consider adaptations of the “Hybrid Model” (Cash Balance Plans) that
can, going forward, substitute for current DB and DC plan models; 13
• Establish a private pension authority to monitor the “third pillar” of the
retirement system and adherence to the principle of “one law, one regulator”;
•  Examine the prospect of introducing universal and compulsory coverage of
all working Canadians;
•  Consider consolidation of the oversight of private sector registered pension
plans under the authority of the proposed private pension authority for
achieving efficiency and economy of scale;
•  Harmonizing more fully the tax treatment of all pension plan transactions,
including funding and payout irrespective of their origin and structure; and
•  Codify a set of guiding principles aimed at guarding the system against
human error and external shocks.
Should DB plans continue to represent the desired Canadian standard, one
opportunity resides in the alternative of designing a “time weighted” methodology
that reflects and accounts for respective contributions and actions of plan
sponsors and members. In time, it can be expected also that the establishment
of  defined  contribution  arrangements  and  multi-employer  pension  plans
(MEPPs) will gain accelerated acceptance; if only for increased simplicity and
sustainability.
CGA-Canada  is  encouraged  by  the  growing  appetite  for  coordinated 
pan-Canadian action that harmonizes the efforts of federal and provincial
stakeholders. In so doing, likelihood is heightened to enhance information
symmetry and to introduce comprehensive, systematic, and lasting improvements.1415
Since our June 2005 update on defined benefit pensions plans, there has been
a titanic shift in the basic structure of global economic order. To many, the
world financial system was seen to have almost collapsed in the aftermath of
the 2008 economic downturn.  Some of the titans of yesterday’s global financial
system collapsed and the resulting new economic order famously christened
as a “new normal” by Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) is
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Table 1 – Comparative Characteristics of “Old” and “New” Normal
The group of G-7 developed nations
shaped the world economic order.
The G-7 nations led world economic
growth.
Individuals, businesses and governments
were highly leveraged and were net
spenders.
The financial markets were lightly regulated.
The “Efficient Market Hypothesis” constituted
the central idea for explaining financial 
market behaviour.
Financial risk management systems were
employed on value at risk and similar 
models based on normal distributions.
The overall GDP growth in developed
economies was hearty, and returns on 
investments in equities were high.
The global rate of inflation was relatively
low.
Interest rates were progressively declining.
The outsourcing of manufacturing and 
services proceeded very rapidly.
Innovations, growth and modernizations
were the main drivers of business strategy.
Old Normal
The group of G-20 developed and emerging
economies presides over the new 
economic order.
The economies of Brazil, Russia, India and
China combined (BRIC) are expected to 
be the engines of future world economic
growth.
Individuals, businesses and governments
will be increasingly deleveraged and 
become net savers.
The financial markets will be tightly 
regulated.
Financial market behaviour is increasingly
interpreted within the framework of 
behavioural finance.
It is recognized that financial markets have
“fat tail” distributions as articulated in the
Black Swan Theory”
2
The overall GDP growth in developed
economies will be slower, and matched by
ordinary returns on equity investments.
The world is expected to enter into an age
of inflation; perhaps in some jurisdictions,
hyperinflation.
The interest rates will progressively increase.
Protective and restrictive trade practices
may emerge.
Risk management and corporate sustainability
increasingly represent the main drivers of
business strategy.
New Normal
2   Taleb Nassim Nicholas: “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable” Random House (U.S.)
April, 2007. Writing in the New York Times, Taleb explained, “What we call here a Black Swan (and 
capitalize it) is an event with the following three attributes. First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the
realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility.
Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct
explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable”. 16
dramatically different from what can be characterized as the “old normal”. This
monumental shift has had far reaching implications for Canadian pension plans,
administrators, beneficiaries and regulators. An understanding of this change
is imperative and serves well in complementing conventional comprehension
of the current state of pension plans. Although, there is no general agreement
on what constitutes the “new normal” or how it is different from the “old normal”,
Table 1 highlights some of the commonly accepted contrasts.
In a Canadian context, and indeed at different rates across developed economies,
long-term demographic trends constitute an integral part of the “new normal”
and should expectedly be duly considered when appraising the state of pension
plans. Adapted from publicly available Statistics Canada
3 information, a number
of findings are worth highlighting in the context of our current discussion.
Demographic Trends in Canada
Discussed in an earlier CGA-Canada paper titled “Growing Up: The Social
and Economic Implications of an Aging Population” Canada, like others, is
experiencing population aging not only because of the older population is
growing relative to the total population, but because of decline in the younger 
population.  Taken  together,  increased  life  expectancy  and  fertility  rates 
persistently below necessitated replacement levels exert the greatest influence
on Canada’s ageing dynamic. As of July 1, 2009, the median age of Canada’s
population had increased by 0.2 years from the year prior to 39.5 years; and
by 3.1 years since 1999. Given the current trajectory, the median age is expected
to reach 44.0 years by 2030 and almost 46 years by 2050.
The Working-Age Population
Parallel to the population as a whole, Canada’s working-age population is
likewise aging. Up from 38.4 years in 1999, the median age of Canada’s 
15-64 working-age population reached 40.5 years as of July 1, 2009. The
largest population cohort in Canada’s history, today’s 45-64 boomers account
for in excess of 40.4% of the nation’s working-age population; up by about 
7 percentage points from 1999. During the same period, the proportion of 
persons  aged  30-44  years  within  the  working-age  population  declined  to
30.1%  from  36.6%  while  those  15-29  years  modestly  declined  to  29.5%
from 29.9%.
With baby-boomers expected to progressively exit the workplace beginning in
2011, the current proportion represented by the 45-64 years of age group,
within the working-age population has all but crested. 
3  http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/091127/dq091127b-eng.htm17
Concomitantly, the absolute size of the working-age population could
conceivably shrink from 69.5% as of July 1, 2009 to approximately 62.0%
by 2030; all the while at risk of fading further thereafter. Importantly also, it
is noted that while Canada did experience labour force growth between 2000
and 2010, the absolute size of the 15-64 years labour force is not expected to
experience meaningful growth between 2010 and 2030; contrary to such countries
as the U.S., Mexico, and India. That said Europe and Japan are expected to
experience the sharpest declines in working age population with anticipated
reductions of 13% and 19% respectively between 2000 and 2030.      
Perhaps more striking for the purposes of this discussion is the manifestation
that the elderly dependency ratio of 19 retirees for every 100 workers in 2005
is projected to rise to 39 retirees per 100 workers by 2030 and to 44 retirees
for every 100 workers by 2050.
The Nation’s Elderly
Not all countries are aging at the same rate. In some European countries for
example, the fertility decline was experienced earlier than in North America
and their populations are correspondingly older than that of Canada. Having
one of the lowest proportions of seniors among the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, individuals 65 years and
over nevertheless accounted for a record high 13.9% of Canada’s population
as of July 1, 2009. 
Figure 1 – Proportion of Estimated Population Aged 45 to 64 
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Source: Statistics Canada – The Daily, November 27, 2009.18
Countries having low fertility rates such as Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan
are starting to witness shrinking of their populations. In the United States,
where fertility rates are closer to renewal levels and immigration rates have
typically been the highest in the developed world, the population is aging
somewhat less rapidly than in other developed nations. 
As the Canadian boomer cohort enters this age grouping over the coming
decades, the proportion of people 65 years of age and older will naturally
increase at a fast pace. Projections reveal that this group could account for up
to 25.0% of the population by the end of the 2030s. 
The most rapid growth is occurring in the 80-plus and 85-plus age groupings.
Between 1991 and 2001, the 80-plus population increased by 40.91 % and
projections for 2001 to 2011 show an additional increase of about 43% for an
estimated 1.33 million Canadians over the age of 80 years. Representing 3.8%
of the Canadian population as of July 1, 2009, it is projected that by 2050, the
80-plus cohort will make up about 37% of the over 65 grouping.
Sobering Deduction
Long-term demographic trends challenge the Canadian retirement system.
First, the increasing greying of the population will serve to generate greater
demand on the retirement system. Meanwhile, decline in the numbers of the
working-age population will serve to inflict constriction of funding into the
retirement system. With escalating entitlements (pensioners), funding deficits
can only be exacerbated by a declining contributor (worker) base. Unless this
dual pressure on the system is otherwise relieved and counterbalanced by 
prudent regulatory and pecuniary policies, steady disintegration will befall
Canada’s retirement system(s). 19
With a view to updating its understanding of the private sector defined benefit
pension plan landscape, CGA-Canada commissioned MERCER Human Resources
Consulting to provide data and analysis for the year ended December 31,
2008. To that end, and relying on its Pension Database, MERCER has provided
insights necessary to determine the overall funding position of Canadian DB
pension plans as at December 31, 2008 (simulating Tables 3 and 4 of the 2005
report
4). Moreover, MERCER has provided some counsel in respect to various
technical aspects and the impacts of the financial crisis.
Updated Funding Position as at December 31, 2008
Consistent with earlier works of CGA-Canada, this paper relies on the aggregate
information contained in the 2008 MERCER Pension Database to estimate the
funding position of Canadian pension plans as at December 31, 2008 under a
risk free basis approach.
The risk free basis has been updated to reflect the market conditions as at
December 31, 2008 and is presented as Appendix A, including also the 
comparative measures used at December 31, 2004, the last date at which
results were released. The risk free basis intends to remove any discretion in
the selection of going-concern assumptions of each plan, and it removes also
the influence of the investment policies in the selection of such assumptions. 
The main results as at December 31, 2008 are summarized in Appendix B
(with no indexation of benefits) and Appendix C (with indexation of benefits).
For convenience and comparison, the analogous December 31, 2004 results
have likewise been replicated and provided.
The current analysis includes consideration of 761 plans, covering a total of
1,496,000 members. This compares to the 784 plans and 1,787,000 members
examined in estimating the December 31, 2004 results.
The overall funding position has significantly deteriorated since December 31,
2004 on both bases (with and without indexation), with the vast majority 
of pension plans in a deficit position as at December 31, 2008. The average
funding ratio has decreased from 112% to 77% on the ‘without indexation’
The Current State of Affairs:
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4  Available at http://www.cga-canada.org/en-ca/ResearchAndAdvocacy/Pages/Reports.aspx20
basis and from 71% to 57% on the ‘with indexation’ basis. The main factors
leading to this deterioration can be attributed to:
•  The return for a typical asset mix
5, net of administrative expenses, which
was 2.1% per year over the years 2005 through 2008, as compared to the
yield assumption of 5.0%. This represents a cumulative loss (shortfall) on
assets of approximately 10%.
•  The reduction in market interest rates. For the basis with no indexation of
benefits, the rate has decreased by 1.5% (i.e. from 5.0% to 3.5%), which
represents an increase in plan liabilities of approximately 30%. For the basis
with indexation of benefits, the discount rate net of the assumed inflation
has decreased by 0.25% (i.e. from 1.75% to 1.5%), which represents an
increase in plan liabilities of approximately 5%.
Changes in Practice
• In earlier works, reference was made that “an actuarial valuation must be
carried out at least every three years”. It is noted that the Québec legislation
will require actuarial valuations to be performed annually starting not later
than January 1, 2011 (unless the actuary can certify that the plan is in 
surplus). At the time of writing, it is prospected that modifications will be
brought to direct that federally regulated plans will likewise be subject to
annual valuations. 
•  While leaving unaltered earlier CGA-Canada assumptions and findings, it
is noted that most plan sponsors are now using the same mortality table as
the one used by CGA-Canada (the UP94G table), or a similar table.
Representing potentially a departure for some plan sponsors, this adoption
represents consistency with the CGA-Canada approach selected.     
•  The number of DB plans, and the number of plan members covered by
them, has experienced some shrinkage. The representative sample contained
in MERCER’s Pension Database is, however, deemed to constantly represent
roughly 30% of the Canadian RPP market as validated by cross reference
to information from Statistics Canada on assets of Canadian pension plans.
Impact of Financial Crisis
In the fall of 2008, the financial crisis, which had been sparked in 2007,
worsened substantially. Markets lost significant value in almost every asset
class. For example, the S&P/TSX Composite index tumbled by almost 29% in
September-October 2008 alone. During this same period, U.S. stock values
dropped by 13% and international stock values fell by 22% (returns measured
in Canadian dollars), while the main nominal bond indices fell by 3% to 8%.
5  25% Canadian equities, 15% US equities, 15% international equities, 42.5% fixed income and 
2.5% money market21
Stock and bond markets around the world continued to lose value through
February 2009.
As a result of some high-profile bankruptcies in the United States, particularly
in the financial sector, investors demanded higher yields on corporate bonds.
Even in Canada, where the crisis was not as deep or as far-reaching, this effect
was significant. From September 2008 to March 2009, yields to maturity on
long-term high-quality corporate bonds rose from about 5.5% per year to
8.0% per year.
Another symptom of investors’ heightened fear of corporate defaults was an
increased demand for investments with a lower risk profile. This “flight to
quality” pushed yields on long-term Government of Canada bonds from about
4.3% per year to about 3.5% in the last two months of 2008.
The resulting increase in the “credit spread” (the difference between corporate
and government bond yields) dramatically illustrates the effect of the financial
crisis on the bond markets.
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Source: MERCER Human Resources Consulting.22
Illustrated in Figure 2, this effect has reversed somewhat since the spring of
2009. Yields on long-term high-quality corporate bonds have fallen back to
around 6.0% per year, and long-term government yields are around 4.0% per
year. The 2.0% credit spread is still quite a bit higher than the level seen from
2003 through mid-2007 (well under 1.0%), but this is still a significant change
from its high in spring 2009 of about 4.25%.
Effect of Crisis on Funding Status of
Canadian Pension Plans
The events described had a devastating effect on Canadian pension plans. During
the six months from September 2008 to February 2009, the typical pension
plan lost about 20% of its assets value, measured on a market value basis.
At the same time, falling yields on government bonds pushed solvency liabilities
higher given that these obligations are valued by reference to government
bond yields. However, in early 2009, the Canadian Institute of Actuaries
(CIA) modified its guidance to member actuaries on how interest rates to
approximate annuity purchases could be derived. A large portion of many 
solvency liabilities are assumed to be settled through the purchase of annuities
so this assumption has had significant effect on the funding status of pension
plans. The revised guidance from the CIA allowed higher interest rates than
would have been derived under previous guidance. This was a reflection of
lower annuity prices on the market, which were in turn a reflection of the higher
yields insurance companies were experiencing on the corporate bond portfolios
they use to back annuity liabilities. Overall, between the fall in government
bond yields, and the increased spreads permitted by the CIA guidelines, annuity
purchase rates remained relatively stable in late 2008, which meant that most
of the decline in funding status resulted from decreased asset values.
According to MERCER estimates, 71% of Canadian defined benefit pension
plans were in solvency deficit positions at the end of 2007. By the end of 2008,
that statistic had risen to 92% (Table 2). At the end of 2008, almost 40% of
defined benefit plans had solvency ratios under 70%, and over 70% of defined
benefit plans had solvency ratios under 80% (Figure 3). 
Table 2 – Percentage of Private DB Plans in Solvency Deficit
2006 2007 2008
Proportion of Plans in Solvency Deficit  66% 71% 92%
Total Assets ￷ Total Liabilities (All Plan)   103% 104% 82%
Total Assets ￷ Total Liabilities (Plans in Deficit)  89% 92% 81%23
It is worth mentioning that, in stark contrast to the sharp increases in funding
requirements caused by the recent crisis, the cost of pension plans reported in
most sponsors’ financial statements experienced significant decreases in 2009.
This is because most plan sponsors set the discount rates used to calculate the
cost of their pension obligations for financial reporting purposes by reference
to high-quality corporate bond yields. As discussed, such yields increased 
dramatically in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. For 
sponsors whose fiscal year ends fell within that time frame, such increased
rates typically caused the reported pension expense to be much lower in the
following year, resulting in a disparity between lower reported costs on 
financial statements and greatly increased cash needs in the same year.
Government Response to Pension Funding Crisis
While many jurisdictions in Canada had already begun movement toward
reform of pension legislation, the crisis demanded that the pace of such reform
be accelerated. Virtually every province, as well as the federal government 
for those plans that fall under their jurisdiction, implemented some form of
temporary solvency funding relief for sponsors of defined benefit pension
plans in 2008. While measures diverged across the various jurisdictions, the
most common option was to allow amortization of solvency deficits over a 
10-year period, instead of over the usual five years; a change that could have
a significant effect on cash funding requirements in the short term. In some
jurisdictions, such as Ontario, the use of relief measures was constrained by
the requirement to obtain some level of member consent.
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Generally, the measures were intended to be temporary, and were only available
for the first funding valuation report filed under the relief measures. While
most agreed that temporary measures were necessary to help sponsors meet
their funding requirements in the short term, the economic crisis also highlighted
the need for broader, more far-reaching and fundamental reforms to pension
legislation. For example, Ontario’s Expert Commission on Pensions released its
report in 2008 and permanent changes to the Ontario legislation are expected
in the next few months. Following a series of public consultations, the Federal
Department of Finance announced proposed changes to pension legislation
governing federally registered pension plans. Generally, these measures were
designed to enhance benefit security for members, while including some
provisions to mitigate the volatility of pension funding requirements.
At the same time, the Federal government announced that the limit on defined
benefit surplus under the Income Tax Act would be significantly increased. For
most plans, this limit will be increased from 10% of liabilities to 25% of plan
liabilities. This means that sponsors will now be permitted to contribute to
their  pension  plans  when  the  surplus  is  below  25%  of  the  going-concern 
liabilities. While this measure will affect all defined benefit plans in Canada,
such an increase will only be useful when those plans are in surplus positions
again, and only to the extent that sponsors are willing to build up larger surpluses
that they may not be able to benefit from.
It is worth mentioning that Québec introduced permanent changes to pension
plan funding rules a few years ago which included the requirement to build a
funding cushion before a sponsor can reduce its contributions. Other provincial
regulators are also in the process of studying or enacting further pension reforms. 
Plan Sponsors’ Response to Pension Funding Crisis
In the wake of the crisis, plan sponsors have been anxious to find solutions
to address the rising funding costs of their pension plans, which can take 
various forms.
Direct Cost Reduction
Some sponsors have attempted to reduce pension funding costs by reducing
the  benefits  offered  by  the  plan,  or  abandoning  the  defined  benefit  plan 
altogether,  often  in  favour  of  a  more  economical  and  predictable  defined 
contribution plan. While this approach can save money in the long term, it
does little to address the short-term problem caused by depressed asset values
and increased liabilities, as it is very difficult, if not impossible, to reduce 
benefits already accrued. Sponsors attempting these initiatives also run the
risk of distressing employees by paring down existing benefits. Hypothetically25
attractive, in practice it is extremely difficult to replace a defined benefit plan
by a defined contribution plan in a bargaining environment, even if restricted
to the prospect of future employees only.
Other approaches to reducing costs include the introduction of cost-sharing
with employees, or adjusting the current level of cost-sharing. Unfortunately,
in most cases this does not solve the short-term funding problem, since special
deficit payments continue to fall within the responsibilities of the employer 
or sponsor.
Liability-Driven Investing
The impact of changes in asset values and market interest rates has highlighted
for many sponsors the inherent mismatch between the characteristics of the
liabilities in the pension plan and the assets that underwrite them. In particular,
most pension plans invest in a fairly typical mix of approximately 60% equities
and 40% fixed-income securities having medium duration. When market interest
rates move, the liabilities react in much the same way as long-term bonds, but
the assets do not normally move in the same direction.
Liability-driven investing (LDI) refers to a variety of investment approaches
that  are  specifically  designed  to  mitigate  this  mismatch  risk.  In  some
instances, implementing such a strategy can cause the pension plan to be more
expensive on average than under the typical approach, but with much less
volatility. After suffering from the rapidly changing costs in 2008 and 2009,
many plan sponsors may consider this trade-off more seriously.
Increased Focus on Plan Governance
Whether sponsors have taken concrete actions to alter their plans’risk profiles
or not, the crisis has illuminated the need for a greater emphasis on pension
governance. Having clearly articulated the decision-making structure and process
can help sponsors gain confidence in their decisions and in the documentation
of these decisions during uncertain times. In addition, the crisis has given
sponsors a greater understanding of the risks they are taking on in sponsoring
defined benefit plans. 
Effect of Crisis on Plan Members
The crisis has had a significant effect on many pension plan members; some
more directly than others.
For some members of defined benefit pension plans, there have been significant
and direct effects. At worst, in cases of sponsor insolvency where the plan is
also significantly underfunded, there may not be adequate funds available to26
fund plan deficits and members will experience permanent reductions in
benefits already accrued. The high-profile nature of some of these cases
6
has highlighted for members, that even in defined benefit plans, pensioners
continue to be dependent on the long-term financial viability of their former
employer(s).
In less extreme cases, sponsors may freeze a plan for future accruals or future
hires,  reduce  benefits  prospectively,  or  increase  the  cost-sharing  borne  by
employees. All of these actions equate to reduced member benefits in the 
long term.
For some members of defined benefit plans, there may have been no obvious
impact on their promised benefits. Many plan sponsors will pay for the cost of
funding the deficits directly, with no changes to plan design. The extra 
expenditures, however, may force the sponsor to cut back on other forms of
compensation, or to reduce its workforce.
For  defined  contribution  members,  the  effect  of  the  crisis  is  more  direct.
Without the risk pooling inherent in defined benefit plans, defined contribution
members experienced significant losses in their individual accounts. While it
is likely that most of these members will recover their losses over time, not all
members can afford to wait for that to happen; particularly older members. 
This has had a meaningful effect on members’ decisions as to when they can
retire and how much income they will have during retirement.
Actuarial Profession’s Response to
Pension Funding Crisis
With the recently increased attention being paid to pension issues by various
parties, and a possibly greater openness to change, the Canadian Institute of
Actuaries (CIA) has recognized an opportunity to fine-tune its collective view
on the pension system and to advocate for some basic reforms and changes.
In November 2009, for example, the CIA released its paper
7 containing
opinions and suggestions representing a broad cross-section of leading-edge
ideas from experienced professionals.
The CIA paper is based on certain core needs of Canadians, including expanded
pension coverage and a higher overall level of retirement savings. The paper
contains a deliberate bias toward defined benefit pension plans, which are
6  Notable cases include Nortel Networks, AbitibiBowater, Fraser Papers, and CanWest
7  Canadian Institute of Actuaries, “Retooling Canada’s Ailing Pension System Now, For The Future:
Canada’s Actuaries Advocate Change” November, 200927
received as a more efficient regime for allocating risk and providing retirement
income than defined contribution plans. Reasonably, the CIA asserts that the
recent decline in defined benefit plan coverage in Canada is not in our society’s
best interests.
To address the flaws of the current system, the CIA paper articulates a 10-step
plan accentuating increased national focus; increased education for members
on  retirement  issues;  alternative  ideas  for  funding  which  improve  benefit 
security for members while providing some flexibility and clarity for sponsors
on surplus use and ownership; and re-examination of priority given to under-
funded pension benefits (i.e. pension plan members could take priority over
certain creditors) and to accrued benefits (i.e. certain types of benefits could
take priority over other types) when an employer becomes insolvent at a time
when the pension plan is underfunded.
Generally, the crisis has raised awareness of, and interest in, pension issues
among sponsors, members, and regulators. Most of these issues have existed
for decades, but have not been fully appreciated by most stakeholders; or 
perhaps  have  been  beyond  immediate  reach.  Now  there  seems  to  be  a 
collective will on the parts of pensioners, regulators, and sponsors alike to
address the problems inherent to the system. Importantly, balanced solutions
will be required if Canadians are to enjoy affordable, secure, and sustainable
retirement incomes. 2829
A defined contribution (DC) plan is one that specifies the employee’s (if the
plan is contributory) and the employer’s contributions. Members’ benefits are
provided from accumulated contributions plus earned return on investment. 
It is a type of retirement plan in which the amount of the employer’s annual
contribution is fixed and individual investment accounts are set up for employees.
In many instances, employees may, at their discretion, contribute over and above
their employer’s respective contribution. The benefits for the participants are
linked to the contributions made to their respective accounts coupled with
performance of the plan’s investments. Only employer contributions to the
account are guaranteed, not the future benefits. DC plans may come in the
forms of registered pension plans (RPPs), group registered retirement savings
plans (RRSPs) and deferred profit sharing plans (DPSPs). They can also be
combined with employee stock option plans (ESOP). Recently, there has been
a shift among employers towards DC plans. There are a number of reasons for
this migration.
Risk Management
It is seldom prudent for a company to undertake future pension obligations
extending beyond its own life expectancy; a situation that an employer can
avoid by introducing a defined contribution plan instead of defined benefit
plan. A DC plan, unlike a DB plan, affords certainty of expense and cash flow
for the employer and hence assists in planning, controlling and monitoring risk. 
Employee Empowerment and Motivation
A DC plans allows the employee to exercise greater control over retirement
planning and increased adaptation to their own individual circumstances and
lifestyle. Some forms of DC plans like DPSP and ESOP also serve to align
individual employee goals with corporate goals, and hence motivate employees
to enhance the value of the enterprise. 
Control and Flexibility
DC plans allow members more flexibility and more options in regards to their
target  retirement  date,  portability  of  their  retirement  benefits  from  one
employer to another, and also financing major expenses like home purchase
and continuing education. These elements of control and flexibility appear to
make DC plans more attractive; at least to younger generations. Also, DC
plans impose ownership responsibilities on the participants for shaping their
working lives and retirement expectations. 
The Current State of Affairs: Defined
Contribution Plans in Canada 430
DC plans can be structured basically in one of the following two ways:
Managed DC Plans
In addition to making the monetary contributions, the employer is actively
involved in the management of the plan assets. The plan is managed by the
representatives of the employer and of the employees.
Self-Directed DC Plans
The employer is not involved in the investment decisions or control of the
funds. The role of the employer is essentially limited to making contractual
contributions. The investment decision is at the discretion of each employee,
who  controls  and  invests  his/her  share  of  contribution  in  his/her  own 
individual capacity.
Current State of Canadian DC Plans
An analytical study published by Statistics Canada profiles the current state of
defined contribution pension plans in Canada
8. This report is based on an
annual census of all registered pension plans in Canada, the “Pension Plans in
Canada” Survey. Highlights of this analytical study include: 
•  By 2006, DB pension plans represented 81% of the workers participating
in registered pension plans while DC plans represented a more conservative
16%. During the 15 year period ending in 2006, DC plan participation
almost doubled, reaching a participation level of 899,000 members. Figure
4 depicts growth in plan membership for the period of 1991 to 2006.
8  Philippe Gougeon. “Shifting pensions. Perspectives on Labour and Income.” Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
Summer 2009. Vol. 21, Iss. 2; pg. 43, 8 pgs












Source: Statistics Canada – Perspectives, May 2009 as adapted from Statistics Canada, 
Pension Plans in Canada Survey.31
• Membership fluctuations were greater in the private sector, where DB
plans gave up 279,000 members between 1991 and 2006 and DC plans
gained  382,000.  Changes  were  nearly  nonexistent  in  the  public  sector.
Table 3 presents participation in DB and DC plans by sector.      
•  The  private  sector  stimulated  the  bulk  of  increased  activity  in  defined 
contribution plan participation with DC plan membership in the private
sector nearly doubling over the 1991 to 2006 period. As revealed in 
Figure 5, coverage in the private sector increased from 14% to 27% while
coverage in the public sector remained relatively invariable during the 1991
to 2006 period.




Defined benefit plan members 2,463,700 2,550,800
Defined contribution plan members 80,900 132,100
Private Sector
Employees 8,814,600 11,781,400
Defined benefit plan members 2,309,700 2,030,500
Defined contribution plan members    384,900 766,800
Source: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada Survey.
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Source: Statistics Canada – Perspectives, May 2009 as adapted from Statistics Canada, 
Pension Plans in Canada Survey.32
• Throughout the 1991 to 2006 period, DC plans were more customarily
offered by smaller employers
9. Interestingly though, these plans have gained
popularity in all group sizes and continue to attract increased attention as
plan sponsors navigate their benefits offering in these challenging times.
Conversely, with the exception of the very large DB pension plans, DB
plan membership has waned (Table 4).
• While plans have naturally been initiated, redesigned, and otherwise 
terminated and have been subject also to variation in plan participation, it
is interesting to note that plan conversions have most affected the decrease
Table 4 – Pension Plan Coverage by Group Size
1991 2006
Small Plans 269,300 100% 219,300 100%
DB 122,900 45.6% 60,400 27.5%
DC 146,400 54.4% 158,900 72.5%
Medium Plans 794,900 100% 818,900 100%
DB 630,400 79.3% 461,500 56.4%
DC 164,500 20.7% 357,400 43.6%
Large Plans 1,186,600 100% 1,259,600 100%
DB 1,092,100 92.0% 968,300 76.9%
DC 94,500 8.0% 291,300 23.1%
Very large Plans 2,988,400 100% 3,182,500 100%
DB 2,928,000 98.0% 3,091,200 97.1%
DC 60,400 2.0% 91,300 2.9%
Source: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada Survey.
9  Plan Sizes: small (3 to 99 active members); medium (100 to 999 active members); large (1,000 to 9,999
active members; very large (10,000 or more active members).
Table 5 – Sources of Change in Plan Membership
DB Plans DC Plans
Membership Variation  -192,100 100% 433,200 100%
Plan Conversions -149,400 77.7% 56,400 13.0%
Plan Openings and Closures -14,200 7.4% 98,700 22.8%
Change in Membership  -28,500 14.9% 278,100 64.2%
Source: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada Survey.33
in DB plan membership while increased membership in DC plans has come
about through augmented participation in pre-existing plans (Table 5) .
• In 1991, DB plans covered most pension plan members in all industries.
Fifteen years later, the number of DC plans had increased in all industries
and even included most of the pension plan members of some sectors; 
particularly  in  mining,  quarrying,  and  oil  and  gas  extraction,  and  in 
wholesale trade (Table 6).
Table 6 – Pension Plan Membership % by Industry
1991 2006
Industry 91.10 8.90 83.60 16.40
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting 55.10 44.90 44.40 55.60
Mining, quarrying, and oil and 
gas extraction 82.60 17.40 45.80 54.20
Utilities 99.40 0.60 94.30 5.70
Construction 90.50 9.50 85.90 14.10
Manufacturing 90.50 9.50 76.50 23.50
Wholesale trade 71.70 28.30 48.90 51.10
Retail trade 79.20 20.80 75.40 24.60
Transportation and warehousing 89.00 11.00 81.50 18.50
Information, culture, arts, 
entertainment and recreation 93.80 6.20 57.50 42.50
Finance and insurance, 
administrative and professional
services, real estate 87.30 12.70 77.40 22.60
Educational services, health care 
and social assistance 93.80 6.20 89.40 10.60
Accommodation and food services 81.40 18.60 70.80 29.20
Other services 71.50 28.50 34.90 65.10
Public administration 96.90 3.10 95.90 4.10













• A logistic regression analysis could not explain the considerable increase
in DC plans by factors such as the industrial structure, plan size and
distribution of plan participants by gender.
Conclusion
The Canadian retirement system is shifting towards DC plans, away from the
DB plans. This trend is more pronounced and visible in the private sector than
in the public sector, and across plan sizes. A major portion of this growth is
accounted for by conversions of DB plans into DC plans. The cause for this
shift is not explained by other factors like industry structure changes or plan
sizes. This development, while not necessarily alarming, indicates a transfer
of risk and rewards from the employer to the employees and a fundamental
shift in the composition of the Canadian retirement system. This trend is
confirmed by  the  MERCER  2009  Global  Defined  Contribution  survey:
Canadian results.
10
10  Available at http://www.mercer.ca/home.htm?siteLanguage=100735
Introduction
The prospect of participating in an employer-sponsored retirement program
is considered important by both employees and employers. As an important 
element  of  a  successful  recruitment  and  retention  strategy,  employees’ 
contributions  to  such  plans  are  often  supplemented  by  employers  while
employee contribution deductions are incorporated into the regular payroll
cycle — easing the stress of financial discipline. Correspondingly, defined
benefit pension plans offer an ability to mitigate such employee’s retirement
risks  as  income  replacement  inadequacy,  market  fluctuations,  cash-flow
uncertainty resulting from longevity uncertainty and inflation.
The recent financial crisis accompanied by a chain of high-profile bankruptcies
highlighted the other side of defined benefit pension plans — the risk that an
employer fails to fulfill its pension obligations. Nortel is probably the most
recent  and  noticeable  example.  A  company  reasonably  considered  to  be
Canada’s technology standard-bearer with market capitalization of some $385
billion at its peak in 2000, filed for bankruptcy protection in January 2009.
With Nortel’s pension plans being only 69% funded,
11 the assets in the
company pension  plans  were  insufficient  to  meet  its  obligations,  leaving 
current and former Nortel employees with lower pension benefits than those
‘defined’ by pension arrangement. 
Given the overall decline in the offerings of defined benefit pension plans 
and the possible shift of employee confidence in such plans, we deliberately
allow ourselves to muse over two particular queries. First, would consistent
savings patterns applied throughout an individual’s working life render an
accumulation of retirement savings sufficient to rival that afforded through a
defined benefit pension plan? Second, what income replacement rate can be
achieved  if  an  individual  maximizes  RRSP  contributions  within  eligible
deductions limits throughout working life? 
Defined Benefit Plans vs. Private
Pension Savings — Is There Really
Any Comparison  5
11  CBC.ca (2010). Ontario to Partially Guarantee Nortel Pensions, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/windsor/story/2010/02/07/ontario-nortel-pensions943.html 36
Can Private Savings Outperform Defined
Benefit Pension Plans?
In the Canadian context, the distribution of defined benefit pension plan
members across different industries is highly uneven. Certain industries (for
instance, wholesale trade or community business and personal service) rarely
offer defined benefit plans to their employees. At the same time, nearly half of
the workforce of the utilities sector participates in defined benefit pension
plans. The size of the sector is also important. Although individuals working
in the utilities sector are highly likely to be members of defined benefit plans
for example, altogether they constitute only a minor part (1.4%) of all members
of defined benefit pension plans.
12
Identifying the industry affiliation of the plan members is essential because
the factors that affect the level of pension benefits (i.e. pension indexation, rate
of salary increase, and age of retirement) are often industry or sector specific.
Moreover, the question of whether private savings may prevail over the benefits
of a defined benefit plan is of relevance to only those individuals who are
employed in industries offering defined benefit plans and who consequently
have the choice of either participating in the pension plan or saving on their
own. Analysis shows that two thirds of all members of defined benefit pension
plans are concentrated in three industries: public administration (accounting
for 38.3% of all members in 2007), educational services, health care and
social  assistance  (accounting  for  17.9%  of  members),  and  manufacturing
(which accounts for 10.1% of all members in 2007).
13As the median retirement
age and pension indexation varies for the private and public sector, further
analysis is focused on two industries: public administration, which is treated
as a proxy for the public sector, and manufacturing, which is deemed, albeit
imperfectly, representative of the private sector.
Throughout this section, a generic term ‘private savings’ is used to identify the
pool  of  pension  savings  that  is  accumulated  through  sources  other  than
defined benefit pension plans. For the purpose of the current analysis, private
savings are approximated as the equivalent of an employee’s contribution 
otherwise made to a defined benefit pension plan. In so doing, the outlay
borne by an individual remains identical under either condition — within a
defined benefit pension plan or in its absence. It is assumed that the employer
also contributes to private savings at a rate similar to that typically experienced
under defined contribution pension plans (5% of employee’s earnings). For the
purposes of this exercise, private savings accumulated through this scheme are
branded ‘DB-equivalent private savings’.
12  Based on CANSIM Tables 280-0011 and 281-0024. CGA-Canada computation
13  Based on CANSIM Table 280-0011. CGA-Canada computation37
The hypothetical individual’s financial security at retirement is compared
based on the replacement rate of income otherwise achievable under three
scenarios: (i) the individual is a member of a defined benefit pension plan 
during all years of working life; (ii) the employee accumulates DB-equivalent
private  savings;  and  (iii)  in  addition  to  accumulating  DB-equivalent 
private savings, the employee maximizes eligible RRSP contributions. For the
private savings and RRSP scenarios, it is assumed that the employee makes
RRSP contributions every year throughout working life. It is further assumed
that  tax  refunds  resulting  from  pension  contributions  are  also  invested  in
retirement  savings.  The  possibility  of  using  Tax-Free  Savings  Accounts
(TFSAs) for accumulating private savings is not incorporated in the calculation,
as the novelty of TFSAs does not allow for a substantiated assumption regarding
possible contribution rates. 
A number of assumptions were admittedly made in order to simulate a model
defined benefit pension plan and the investment patterns of individuals. The
assumptions are based on economic and demographic characteristics of the
two industries under review (i.e. public administration and manufacturing), as
well as characteristics of Canadian defined benefit and defined contribution
pension plans as they reveal themselves in the data available from Statistics
Canada.
14 The assumptions regarding pension plans are based on the
characteristics that are common to the prevailing proportion of the members
of  the  plans  included  in  Statistics  Canada’s  dataset.  The  following  key
assumptions are made for the purpose of rudimentary comparison:
•  Pension benefit rate is 2% of employee’s earnings for each year worked.
•  Earnings base is average earnings of the best five years of service.
•  Pension indexation is 2/3 of long-term average CPI (2.5%) for pension
plans in the public sector — there is no indexation for pension plans in the
private sector.
•  Starting salary of the employee in the public sector is $33,000 with an
average annual growth rate of 3.6%. Starting salary of the employee in the
private sector is $29,500 with an average annual growth rate of 2.5%. A
higher than average annual salary increase is assumed to be 5% in both 
sectors. Employee’s earnings equal to employee’s salary.
•  Individual’s career begins at age 25.
•  Retirement age is 60 years of age in the public sector, 62 years of age in
the private sector.
•  Life expectancy is 78 years for male and 83 years for female.
14  Basis of assumptions: CANSIM Tables 280-0017 (earnings base for defined benefit plans, reference year
— 2008), 280-0025 (automatic pension adjustment, reference year — 2008), 102-0511 (life expectancy,
reference year — 2006), 280-0018 (employee contribution rate, reference year — 2008), 280-0020 
(employer contribution rate, reference year — 2008), 282-0051 (median retirement age, reference year
— 2008), 326-0021 (CPI, average for 1986-2009), 282-0072 (salary at the beginning of working career,
reference year — 2009), 202-0107 (rate of salary increase, average for 1997-2007), 280-0022 (benefit
rate for defined benefit plans, reference year — 2008).38
• Individual contribution rate to the defined benefit plan and to DB-equivalent
private savings is 7% of employee’s annual earnings.
•  Employer  contribution  rate  to  DB-equivalent  private  savings  is  5%  of
employee’s annual earnings.
•  Maximum RRSP contribution is the lesser of 18% of individual’s salary or
$21,000 (2009 deduction limit). Tax refunds associated with pension 
contributions is calculated based on the federal and provincial income tax
rates applied in the province of Ontario in 2009.
•  Rates of return on investments for defined benefit plan are as follows:
15
• Rates of return on investments for DB-equivalent private savings and
RRSP contributions are 2/3 of the rate of return used for defined benefit
plan. Rate of return on investments for DB-equivalent private savings and
RRSP contributions after employee’s retirement is 2.5% annually.
•  Two types of family arrangements are considered: (i) single individual with
no dependents; and (ii) married individual in a dual-earner family with no
dependents. Spousal pension is assumed to be 50% of employee’s pension
and both spouses are of the same age.
•  Pension income derived from the Canada Pension Plan, Old Age Security
and Guaranteed Income Supplement programs is not taken into account in
the calculations as these benefits are purposely held to be the same regardless
of retirement income source. 
The salient aspect of the analysis is the conclusion that DB-equivalent private
savings do not allow the employee to achieve a level of income replacement
similar to that offered by a defined benefit pension plan. If RRSP contributions
are maximized, the employee’s ability to match (or exceed) the benefits of the
defined benefit plan improves but still depends greatly on employee’s gender
and marital status. For instance, single male employees could enjoy a better
income replacement rate when maximizing RRSP savings than their female
and/or married colleagues. The obvious reason relates to the longer life
expectancy of women; which necessitates ‘stretching’ of the same pool of pension
savings for a greater number of retirement years. 
The sector of employment is also of importance as it determines differences in
rates of salary increase and indexation of pension benefits. For instance, as seen
Investment 
maturity years 5 10 15 20 25 30 40
Rate of return 3.98% 5.20% 6.71% 7.71% 8.39% 9.50% 8.85%
15  Assumptions on rates of return were constructed based on two sources of information: information on
Canadian capital market returns for 1958-2003 collected by Scotia Capital Inc. (2004), and information
provided by MERCER on rates of return for 2004-2008. The portfolio composition of investments was 
assumed as following: Universal Bonds — 35%, Mortgage Index — 5%, 90-Day Commercial Paper —
5%, S&P/TSX — 55%.39
from Figure 6, individuals employed in manufacturing may well surpass the
benefits offered by the defined benefit plan if they maximize their RRSP
contributions. This becomes possible because a lower rate of salary increase in
manufacturing leads to a relatively modest income at retirement, which is easier
to replace than a relatively higher income attained by employees in public
administration  at  retirement. The  zero  indexation  of  pension  payments  in 
manufacturingalsocontributespositivelytotheemployee’sstrongabilitytoreplace
income at retirement. It should be noted, though, that a higher replacement rate
does not necessary mean a higher amount of pension income in dollars terms. 
39
Figure 6 – Income Replacement Rate 
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As may naturally be expected, some individuals may achieve a higher than
average salary increase throughout their careers. The ‘jump’ may happen due
to attaining a higher level of education than that at the beginning of the career,
switching to a better paid occupation or experiencing fast career growth due
to person’s advanced abilities. Figure 7 presents results of the calculations
assuming that salary increases at a rate higher than average (5%) in both the
public and the private sectors. As can be seen, DB-equivalent private savings
would hardly reach half of the benefits level offered by the defined benefit
plan, particularly in the public sector. Although maximizing RRSP contributions
would permit the employee to improve the income replacement rate, the
defined benefit plan continues to yield superior retirement income.
Figure 7 – Income Replacement Rate (Based on Higher 
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As demonstrated, in most of the cases, maximizing RRSP contributions does
not lead to achieving a level of pension benefits similar to that of defined
benefits pension plans. However, private savings could also be undertaken 
outside of tax-preferred saving instruments. Is it then possible (and realistic)
for an individual to accumulate private savings sufficient enough to ensure the
rate of income replacement similar to that of the defined benefit plan? There
is no one simple answer. Table 7 shows the proportion of employee’s salary
(before tax) that must be put aside annually in order to accumulate the pool of
funds at retirement that would allow income replacement at the same rate as
under a defined benefit plan. It appears that such a task is fairly possible for
an employee working in manufacturing and experiencing an average rate of
salary growth. In turn, this task becomes rather unrealistic for higher income
performers working in either public administration or manufacturing.
Does Investing Tax Refunds Arising from
RRSP Contributions Matter?
While it is typically not within the employee’s discretion to unilaterally decide
whether or not to join a defined benefit pension plan, the above calculations
do present a convincing argument in favour of membership. Generally providing
a superior form of income replacement at retirement, an honoured defined
benefit plan bestows on its members a distinct advantage. For this reason,
declining defined benefit pension plan coverage is received as bad news to
many. And while a good number of employers offer no pension, the decline,
which is particularly noticeable in the private sector employing some 77% of
all working Canadians is disturbing (Figure 8).
Table 7 – Percentage of Savings Contributions Needed to Achieve 
DB Retirement Replacement Rate
Public Administration Manufacturing
Average Salary Increase Single Married Single Married
Male 18.5% 21.4% 10.6% 12.2%
Female 24.3% 24.3% 13.8% 13.8%
Higher Than Average 
Salary Increase Single Married Single Married
Male 24.0% 27.6% 17.8% 20.4%
Female 31.3% 31.3% 23.0% 23.0%
Note: The concepts of “average” and “higher than average” annual salary increase are applied in 
a manner consistent to that used in Figures 6 and 7. Specifically, an average salary increase is 
considered a 3.6% in public administration and 2.5% in manufacturing, whereas higher than average
salary increase is 5% in both sectors.
Source: CGA-Canada computation42
As the burden of retirement saving is noticeably shifting to individuals, it
becomes increasingly important that available tools and incentives be put to
good use in order to expand the value of savings. The analysis presented 
highlights the sizable benefits enjoyed by simply reinvesting the pension 
contribution tax refund. 
Previously described, the calculations assume that tax refunds received are
reinvested as part of pension savings. At retirement, these tax savings constitute
a noticeable proportion of the employee’s pension income. As seen from Table 8,
an average employee working in either the private or the public sector may
enjoy at least 14% higher pension income solely due to investing (as opposed
to consuming) tax savings. For a pension of, say $35,000, this tax savings could
add up to as much as $5,000 in extra income annually. More accomplished
individuals may benefit from the tax savings to an even greater extent. For
them, tax savings may boost their pension income by as much as 18%. 
Figure 8 – Registered Pension Plan Coverage, 
Private Sector, 1977-2006
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Table 8 – Proportion of Retirement Income Formed by Tax Savings
Public Administration Manufacturing
Employee with average 
salary increase 16.6% 14.5%
Employee with higher than 
average salary increase 18.6% 18.1%
Source: CGA-Canada computation.43
Conclusion
The presented calculations intended to focus on the most typical member of
defined benefit pension plans.Although it is likely that no particular individual
in real life perfectly fits the hypothetical profile designed for this simulation,
it seems fairly certain that defined benefit pension plans offer their members
not only perceived greater confidence in their retirement but also superior
monetary benefit. Nevertheless, members of defined benefit pension plans
may benefit from being attuned to changes in the financial and economic 
position of their employers and look to complement and to diversify their
anticipated retirement holdings.
For those who are not members of defined benefit pension plans, working
longer may be a practical solution for improving income replacement rates.
Either  way,  optimizing  and  investing  tax  refunds  received  due  to  pension 
contributions may prove a crucial element in improving financial security at
retirement. Important enough, at least, that it not be casually dismissed.4445
The CanadianAccounting Standards Board (AcSB) has announced the transition
to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for Publicly Accountable
Enterprises  (PAEs)  beginning  January  2011.  The  following  discussion  is
adapted from the information available on the AcSB website.
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TheAcSB’sApril 2008 Exposure Draft, “Adopting IFRSs in Canada,” proposed
that, upon adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) by
publicly accountable enterprises, pension plan sponsors would continue to
prepare their financial statements in accordance with Section 4100, “Pension
Plans”, rather than International Accounting Standard (IAS) 26 “Accounting and
Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans”. The AcSB subsequently confirmed
this intent in its March 2009 Exposure Draft, “Adopting IFRSs in Canada, II,”
and in addition, noted that:
“… the AcSB is considering the extent to which Section 4100 requires change,
as well as whether guidance in addition to that found in Section 4100 is
needed after 2011, and, if so, the appropriate source of such guidance. The
AcSB’s proposals in this area will be exposed for public comment separately
from this Exposure Draft.”
In February 2010, the AcSB approved Section 4600, “Pension Plans”, as Part
IV of the Handbook with an expected issuance date of April 2010. The new
Section is based on existing Section 4100, Pension Plans in Part V of the
Handbook, with the following substantive modifications:
Scope
• The standards apply to all pension plans as well as to benefit plans providing
benefits other than pensions but having characteristics similar to those of
pension plans (for example, retiree health care and life insurance benefits,
and long-term disability plans), with necessary adaptations.
Basis of Accounting
• A pension plan follows the requirements set out in the standards for the
measurement, presentation, and disclosure of its investment portfolio and
pension obligations.




portfolio or pension obligations, a pension plan complies (on a consistent
basis) with either IFRSs in Part I of the Handbook, or accounting standards
for private enterprises in Part II of the Handbook, to the extent that those
standards do not conflict with the requirements of the Section.
•  A pension plan also follows the general financial statement presentation
requirements with respect to fair presentation, comparative information
and materiality in Part I or Part II of the Handbook (consistent with the
choice made for accounting policies that do not relate to the investment
portfolio or pension obligations).
Statement of financial position
• Renamed from “Statement of Net Assets Available for Benefits”.
Presentation
• The statement of financial position includes the net assets available for
benefits (a total including investment assets, investment liabilities, and any
other assets and liabilities of the pension plan), the pension obligations, and
the resulting surplus or deficit.
•  Investment assets and investment liabilities are distinguished by type.
•  Investments in entities over which the pension plan has control or can
exercise significant influence are presented on the same basis as all other
investments (for example, consolidation or equity accounting are not to 
be used).
Recognition
• All financial assets and financial liabilities are recognized and derecognized
in accordance with the applicable requirements in either IAS 39 “Financial
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” in Part I of the Handbook, or
Section 3856, Financial Instruments, in Part II of the Handbook, consistent
with the basis of accounting chosen (see above).
Measurement
• Fair value is determined in accordance with the guidance in IAS 39
“Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement” in Part I of the
Handbook. (The AcSB intends to have Section 4600 refer to the proposed
IFRS on Fair Value Measurement when issued later in 2010.)
•  Investment assets cannot be measured on an actuarial asset value basis.
Also, the difference between fair value and actuarial asset value does not
represent an asset or a liability that can be included in a pension plan’s
financial statements.
•  Consistent with IAS 39, transaction costs are not included in fair value, but
are included in the statement of changes in net assets available for benefits
as part of expenses incurred in the period.47
• An interest in a master trust is measured at fair value, consistent with all
other investment assets. Proportionate consolidation and the equity method
of accounting are not permitted.
•  Measurement  of  a  pension  obligation  at  the  accrued  benefit  obligation
amount determined by the plan’s sponsor is permitted.
Statement of Changes in Net Assets Available for Benefits
• Details of contributions, administrative expenses and benefit payments are
presented.
•  Changes in the fair value of investment assets and investment liabilities on
the statement of financial position include both realized and unrealized
gains and losses.
Statement of Changes in Pension Obligations
• Details of changes in pension obligations are presented.
Disclosure: Investment Portfolio
• For those investments that are financial instruments, the disclosures in
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures in Part I of the Handbook are
required. For all other investments, a description of how fair values have
been determined is provided.
•  Defined  contribution  plans  in  which  the  plan  participants  direct  their
investments may omit disclosure of the quantitative sensitivity analysis 
disclosures for market risk required in IFRS 7.
Disclosure: Capital
• Disclosures are made that enable pension plan financial statement users to
evaluate a plan’s objectives, policies, and processes for managing capital in
accordance  with  the  requirements  in  IAS  1  Presentation  of  Financial
Statements in Part I of the Handbook.
Other disclosures
• A pension plan that prepares its financial statements in accordance with
Canadian accounting standards for pension plans is required to state this
basis of presentation prominently in the notes to its financial statements.
•  The  effective  date  of  the  next  required  actuarial  valuation,  significant
accounting policies, additional related party information, the name of the
actuarial firm that performed the valuation, and significant assumptions
used in determining the pension obligation including the rate of compensation
increase and the discount rate are required disclosures.
•  Other existing “desirable” disclosures are now required disclosures.48
The standards will apply for annual financial statements relating to fiscal years
beginning on or after January 1, 2011. Earlier application is permitted. The
standards apply retrospectively to all prior periods presented.
In summary, it may be concluded that pension accounting standards in Canada
are moving more towards fair value accounting and improved transparency.
This represents a welcome change for the benefit of all stakeholders. In due
course, an improved IAS 26 can be expected to replace or to recast Section 4600
of the Handbook as the applicable standard for pension accounting in Canada.49
The recent changes in the global macroeconomic environment, the arrival of the
age of “new normal,” and the impending demographic crisis warrants redefining
and reformulating of the retirement system in Canada. The required changes are
extensive and far reaching; truly a renaissance in retirement planning. 
The Canadian retirement system essentially rests on three distinct pillars: 
1. Canada Pension Plan/Québec Pension Plan; 
2. Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income Supplement; and 
3. Registered Pension Plans/Registered Retirement Saving Plans.
The first two pillars, as universal public programs, are considered to be on 
relatively sound footing. The third pillar of the system – in particular defined
benefit and defined contribution plans – is the main focus of this study. 
With an abridged review in hand, structural problems can be isolated and 
resolutions pursued.
Defined Benefit Plans
The majority of defined benefit plans are in the public sector, with a much
smaller proportion of them in the private sector. The funding and solvency 
status of public sector DB plans is not under scrutiny because they are backed
by sovereign guarantee and the taxing power of the state. 
Advantages
DB plans provide pooling of risks, a certainty in regards to pensions available
to the participants irrespective of the performance of plan investments, and
hence simplifies their retirement planning. The participants need no additional
expertise as they are not burdened with the management of plan investments.
Disadvantages
The Backgrounder,
17 published by C. D. Howe Institute in December 2009, takes
a closer look at the federal government’s major DB pensions. As pointed out
by the paper, governments are sizeable employers having the ability to extend
defined benefit pension plans – typically characterized as having superior
indexation and early retirement provisions. 
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17  Robson, William B.P; Laurin. A. “ Supersized  Superannuation: The Startling Fair-Value Cost of Federal
Government Pensions” C.D. Howe Backgrounder 122 (December 2009).50
Admittedly, DB plans assist with the recruitment and retention of talent in the
public sector. However, weaknesses in public sector accounting conventions,
coupled  with  instinctive  reticence,  serve  to  moderate  the  true  cost  of  the 
public-service while underestimating also the risks and enduring obligations
that DB plans present. In addition to being expensive, these conditions can be
viewed unfair to current and future generations of taxpayers who reside 
within less generous pension regimes – and especially to those who have no
registered retirement pension plan whatsoever.  
And although DB plans are a popular means for employers to secure talent, a
majority of the plans in the private sector are conceivably unsustainable. As
reported earlier, based on MERCER’s estimates, 71% of Canadian defined
benefit pension plans were in a solvency deficit position at the end of 2007.
By the end of 2008, that statistic had risen to 92%. At the end of 2008, almost
40% of defined benefit plans had solvency ratios under 70%, and over 70% of
defined benefit plans had solvency ratios under 80%. If Canadian businesses
are required to fully fund these plans, many of them will not remain competitive,
or sustainable, in the current globalized economy.
From the perspective of employees, the substantial disadvantage of DB plans
resides in the fact that they are typically not portable and have long vesting
periods. Hence, it can be surmised that DB plans are ill suited for the present
dynamic economy and mobile workforce. Without belabouring the point also,
DB plans are both complex and costly to administer. And given their complexity,
the accounting rules for DB plans have not been as uniform and transparent as
might have been the case were the interests of all stakeholders enjoined. 
Defined Contribution Plans
Advantages
Defined contribution plans do not suffer from the hallmark ailments of typical
defined benefit pension plans. They are typically financially responsible, 
sustainable, and portable and their costs are more capable of being accounted
for in a simple and transparent manner. There is little uncertainty about their
true cost and they are contractually simpler.
Disadvantages
The biggest disadvantage of DC plans originate from uncertainty regarding
the retirement income they will generate for plan participants as the risks and
rewards of ownership reside with participants who are responsible for managing
the investments. More often than not, participants lack expertise to successfully
or  optimally  manage  investment  portfolios  in  today’s  highly  volatile  and 
complex markets. Also, they are vulnerable to cognitive errors in judgment —
particularly given the importance of identifying business life cycles and how51
their respective retirements coincide within them. And then there is a risk that
ordinary investors lack the knowledge or the resources to avoid distress
liquidation within their portfolio. In short, it would be difficult at best to 
mitigate  these  weaknesses  through  education  and  training  of  the  plan 
participants alone.
Strategy
The present pension system is highly skewed in favour of public sector
employees who enjoy certainty of inflation indexed, guaranteed, generous 
and underpriced defined benefit pensions while private sector employees are
straddled  with  underfunded  limited  pension  plans. All  the  while,  a  great
majority of Canadians do not have the security of any type of workplace 
pension plan. Since the first two pillars of the Canadian retirement system
(CPP/QPP & OAS/GIS) are accepted to be on sound footing (although it is
conceivable that benefit is gained through comprehensive review and stress
testing), the focus of our analysis is on the more vulnerable third pillar of the
system: registered pension plans.
A meaningful resolution of the pension dilemma necessitates reliance on a
holistic approach that recognizes employee pension as deferred compensation
and incorporates structural changes in the retirement system, legislative
changes to facilitate transition to the new system, and a new mindset for
employees and employers alike to embrace the global macroeconomic realities
of present day. The goal should be to design a system that is sustainable in the
long term, fair to present and future generations, simpler to administer, and
cost effective. The following paragraphs discuss the anatomy of such a system.
Structure
The humdrum income replacement rate championed by the financial services
industry is often received as being too simplistic and frequently fails to take
into account investment risk, longevity risk and major health care costs. One
size simply does not fit all, and it is therefore essential to establish a credible
target rate of income replacement for each individual depending upon that
individual’s profile. A recent study
18 estimates that most Canadians, should
they wish to retire at age 65 and replace 70 percent of their working incomes,
will need to save from 10 to 21 percent of their pre-tax earnings every year;
assuming they save for 35 years. It is suggested that such a rate should be 
calculated by an independent and neutral arm’s length agency, preferably by the
proposed private pension authority (please see below, “Legal Framework”),
either for each individual or for cohorts of workers having similar profiles.
18 David A. Dodge, Alexandre Laurin and Colin Busby, “The Piggy Bank Index: Matching Canadians’
Saving Rates to Their Retirement Dreams”, C.D. Howe Institute e-brief, March 18, 2010. 52
CGA-Canada recognizes the merits and demerits of DB as well as DC plans
and suggests that adoption of hybrid models, which blend desirable elements
of both DB and DC plans while protecting against their less desirable features,
may be promising. It is beyond the scope of this study to suggest a detailed
design of an alternative model for such a pension plan; a task better suited 
to the profession of actuaries working in concert with regulators. However,
any such plan should comprise of a DB component that guarantees certain 
benefits irrespective of the plan performance and a DC component that would
pay out variable benefits contingent upon plan performance. There should also
be a simple and transparent method of valuing the interest of participants so
that such interest is fully portable on change of employment. It is suggested
that a variation of hybrid models referred to as Cash Balance Plans
19 can be a
starting point, with required modifications as stakeholder consensus evolves.
A Cash Balance Plan is a pension plan under which an employer credits a 
participant’s account with a set percentage of his or her yearly compensation
plus interest charges. For legal purposes, it is a defined benefit plan. As such,
the plan’s funding limit, funding requirements and investment risk are based
on defined benefit plan requirements; and changes in the portfolio do not
affect the final benefits to be received by the participant. Upon retirement or
termination of the plan, the plan sponsor solely bears all ownership of profits
and losses in the portfolio. 
Although the cash balance pension plan is a defined benefit plan, unlike the
regular defined benefit plan, it is maintained on an individual account basis,
much like a defined contribution plan. The cash balance plan also acts in a
similar way to a defined contribution plan because changes in the value of the
participant’s portfolio do not affect the yearly contribution. 
Universal Coverage
The present pension system in Canada has produced pension “haves” and
“have-nots”. At one end of the spectrum are public sector employees who
enjoy the security of government-guaranteed DB pension plans and on the
other  end  of  the  spectrum  are  some  private  sector  employees  having  no
income  or  retirement  security  whatsoever.  This  asymmetrical  coverage  of
working  Canadians  can  be  rectified  by  making  enrolment  in  workplace 
pension plans mandatory for all employees while also re-pricing public sector
pension plans.
19  Pratt, David A., Focus on... Cash Balance Plans in the 21st Century, Part I, Historical Perspective 
(December 4, 2009). Journal of Pension Benefits, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 5, Autumn 200953
Efficiency and Economy of Scale
At present, the majority of the registered pension plans in the private sector are
managed by individual employers and hence do not enjoy the economy of
scale available to the Canada Pension Plan or similar state pension plans. They
also endure problems of governance as their management structure is not
broad based and often lacks investment management expertise that is available
to larger funds. Also, these plans encounter agency issues and conflicts of
interest between the sponsors and the members.
CGA-Canada  sees  well  the  consolidation  of  the  oversight  of  the  private 
sector registered pension plans under the authority of a proposed private 
pension  authority  in  order  to  rectify  the  deficiencies  noted  above.  The 
consolidated plan will conceivably be modeled as a hybrid plan (discussed
above) and operate like CPP, but not mingled with it since it would have a
funding  and  benefit  structure  different  from  that  of  CPP.  It  is  contended 
that the centralized management of RPP funds would be better poised to
counterbalance inequities — while also achieving efficiency and economy of
scale in its operation.
Taxation
CGA-Canada proposes uniform tax treatment of all pension plan transactions,
including funding and payout irrespective of their origin and structure, so that
these transactions are not driven by tax consideration but rational economic
considerations. A commentary
20 published by C.D. Howe Institute reasonably
contends that “Canada’s private retirement saving system serves some workers
well and others not so well, depending on whether they have a career in the
public sector or in the private sector.” 
Previously discussed, many Canadian workers in the private sector have no
employer-sponsored pension arrangements, while those that do can generally
expect plan constructs or plan benefits to pale in comparison. 
The study further highlights that “The unfairness of Canada’s private retirement
saving  system,  which  rests  on  rules  that  limit  annual  contributions  to 
retirement savings vehicles; unnecessarily tie pension saving to employment
and employment income; restrict the kinds of income that can be used for
retirement saving; and inhibit creation of the kind of large, pooled pension
arrangements in the private sector that work well for public sector workers.”
CGA-Canada  supports  the  author’s  commentary  and  would  reiterate  the
importance  of  eliminating  or  relaxing  the  rules  that  limit  an  individual’s 
20  Pierlot, James. “A Pension in Every Pot: Better Pensions for More Canadians”. C.D. Howe Commentary
(November 2008)54
ability to marshal public-sector equivalent retirement resources. As we have
seen herein, it is simply not possible under the current rules to generate or to
mimic the benefits bestowed by public-sector DB pension plans.
Legal Framework
At this time, the legal framework governing private sector pension plans is
fragmented with many cross-jurisdictional differences in legislation and 
regulation.  This  position  imposes  significant  administrative  costs  onto
employers.
A commentary
21 by C.D. Howe Institute suggests four possible options for the
regulatory environment for employer-sponsored pension plans: 1) one law,
one  regulator;  2)  a  model  law  across  Canada  with  multiple  regulators; 
3) multiple jurisdictional laws with one regulator; and 4) multiple jurisdictional
laws with multiple regulators. The author notes that a single law and regulator
is  the  most  efficient  approach  to  address  the  uniformity  issue,  but  may 
also require the resolution of constitutional issues. This view is endorsed and
political leadership is urged to evolve a consensus for resolving constitutional
issues and facilitating instating of a private pension authority under federal
law. We suggest extensive public consultations on the governing structure of
the proposed private pension authority. The legislative changes should also
permit and facilitate collapsing of the existing registered pension plans into
new and superior structures.
Guiding Principles
In addition to the framework outlined above for pension reforms, guiding
principles  should  be  incorporated  in  any  comprehensive  reform  of  the 
retirement system. These principles aim at guarding against the disintegration
of the system in the face of man-made follies and uncontrollable external
shocks. The reference to pension plans is meant to include CPP and RPP
under the management of a private pension authority.
1. No participant in the pension industry should be allowed to grow too big 
to fail. Hence the proposed private pension authority for RPP should be
independent of the CPP. When a participant in the pension industry grows
too big to fail, it should be split into manageable entities.
2.  Whenever a pension industry participant needs to be bailed out, it should
be nationalized and be subject to assumption by the government and not
vice versa.  
3.  Failed theories and enterprises should not be resurrected in new form or
under alternate moniker.
21  Van Riesen, Gretchen. “The Pension Tangle: Achieving Greater Uniformity of Pension Legislation and
Regulation in Canada”. C.D. Howe Commentary 294 (August 2009).55
4. The compensation structure in the pension industry should not be asymmetrical.
There should be no incentives without disincentives, no rewards without
punishment and no nationalization of losses and privatization of gains.
5.  Simple  is  beautiful  and  there  is  no  substitute  for  common  sense.  The 
pension industry should not be subjected to the passing fade of the day.
6.  The investment universe of pension plans should exclude the derivatives
and  similar  highly  risky  instruments,  which  Warren  Buffet  famously
referred to as “weapons of mass destruction”.  
7.  Pension plans should be self-sufficient and sustainable. They should not
operate in a manner that unduly borrows from future generations to pay the
present one. 
8. Pension plans should not be allowed to metamorphose into the empires 
of debt.
9.  Citizens should be encouraged to take charge of their own financial 
destiny and create a fourth pillar to support their retirement by way of 
private savings. 
Conclusion
In a changed world, the Canadian retirement system requires a drastic
makeover. Ad  hoc  arrangements  will  not  solve  the  present  pension  crisis
while  accounting  also  for  Canada’s  demographic  profile.  Canada  requires
comprehensive pension reforms to create a new pension blueprint for the new
normal world. The required changes can be manifested only by combining
regulatory changes and structural changes that do not unnecessarily mingle the
existing three pillars. The third pillar of the system needs to be strengthened
by  affording  greater  protections  or  replacing  unsustainable  DB  plans  and 
inadequate DC plans with hybrid plans that draw upon the best elements of
each. An appropriate set of guiding principles will ensure that the system
remains robust and that it secures the futures of all Canadians.5657
Appendix A 8
Summary of Main Assumptions (Risk Free Basis)





• without indexation of benefits 0% 0%
• with indexation of benefits 3.25% 2.00%
Mortality table
24 UP94G UP94G
Retirement age As per the plan’s  As per the plan’s
own assumption own assumption
22  Determined from the yield on long-term bonds of the Government of Canada.
23  Represents a blended rate of pre-retirement indexation (based on wage increases) and post-retirement
indexation (based on CPI increases).
24  UP94G stands for “uninsured pensioner mortality table 1994 generational.” This table allows for expected
future improvements in pensioners’ mortality and is currently the most commonly used mortality table 
for the funding valuations of pension plans. Even though it is generally seen as a best estimate mortality
table for Canadian pension plans, it is worth mentioning that it is not based on Canadian mortality 
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